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Female economists and philosophers’ role in Amartya Sen’s thought: 
his colleagues and his scholars 
 
Valentina Erasmo1 
     The aim of this paper is to offer an insight about women’s role in Amartya Sen’s thought, 
privileging economists and philosophers: mainly, I will focus on the figures of Joan Robinson, 
Eva Colorni, Martha Nussbaum and Emma Rothschild, showing, on the one hand, how they have 
influenced his thought, on the other, how they have eventually developed their own well-
defined ideas about common research themes. Finally, I will provide an overview about contemporary Sen’s female scholars who have reached international acknowledgments in this 
research in order to distinguish the most important schools of thought born around his 
reflection. The main result of this paper is that, on the one hand, Sen has favoured the enhancement of these female’s figures both in economics and philosophy; on the other, these female’s figures have undoubtedly and significantly influenced his own thought.  Thus, it is 
better to talk of a mutual and peer influence to each other. 
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1. Introduction  
    Women have always hired a crucial role in Amartya Sen’s thought. In the field of development 
economics, among Sen’s most important contribution is that about gender bias in mortality. 
Indeed, this engagement might be emphasized through three main elements (Klasen and Wink, 
2003): between the Seventies and the Eighties, Sen contributed to the earliest literature on 
gender bias in South Asia about allocation of resources, health outcomes and nutrition with 
relevant empirical and theoretical contributions (Sen 1990b; Sen and Sengupta 1983; Kynch 
and Sen 1983); in turn, Sen focused on the abnormally high sex ratios in South Asia, especially 
India: differently from Visaria (1961) who had highlighted these data showing gender bias in 
mortality, Sen preferred to analyse the worsening of the sex ratio; finally, considering both 
gender bias in mortality and the high sex ratios in several developing countries (especially, China, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia), Sen developed the concept of “missing women”. In 1990, on The New York Review of Books, he pointed out how more than 100 million 
of women were missing. Quoting his own words: 
 
it is often said that women make up a majority of the world’s population. They do not. This mistaken 
belief is based on generalizing from the contemporary situation in Europe and North America, where 
the ratio of women to men is typically around 1.05 or 1.06, or higher. In South Asia, West Asia, and 
China, the ratio of women to men can be as low as 0.94, or even lower, and it varies widely elsewhere 
in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. How can we understand and explain these differences? (Sen, 
1990c, p. 1) 
 
     These differences are mainly due to the problem of women’s survival. Indeed, <<the numbers of “missing women” in relation to the numbers that could be expected if men and women 
received similar care in health, medicine, and nutrition, are remarkably large>> (Sen, 1990c, p. 
13). Thus, their deaths are a result on inequalities about the allocation of survival-related 
goods: Sen was surprised that these disadvantages would not have deserved adequate 
attention. However, his complaint has been bearer of further studies on the theme, some of 
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them appeared on the journal “Feminist Economics” (Berik, Dong and Summerfield, 2007; 
Berik, Rodgers and Seguino, 2009; Rubery 2005). In turn, Sen has always entertained a special 
relationship with this journal where he published several contribution (Sen, 2004, 2005a).  
       Considering these elements, I claim how Sen’s relationship with women and feminist 
economics is wider. The aim of this paper is to offer an insight about women’s role in Sen’s 
thought from a different perspective, privileging those female colleagues, economists and 
philosopher, who have established an important intellectual relationship with him: mainly, I 
will focus on the figures of Joan Robinson, Eva Colorni, Martha Nussbaum and Emma 
Rothschild, showing, on the one hand, how they have influenced his thought, on the other, how 
they have eventually developed their own well-defined ideas about common or similar research themes. Finally, I will provide an overview about contemporary Sen’s female scholars who have 
reached international acknowledgments in this research field at the goal of distinguishing the 
main schools of thought in the available literature. The order through which these female 
figures will be deepened is simply historical in order to tell a part of Sen’s history through them. 
       This paper will be composed as follow: in Section 2, I will examine the figure of Joan 
Robinson, Sen’s PhD supervisor in Cambridge who (partially) influenced him through her non-conventional “mainstream” framework, while he refused her positivist view of ethics; instead, 
in Section 3, the main figure will be that of Eva Colorni, Sen’s second wife, thanks to the extraordinary perspective of the “Colorni-Hirschman-Spinelli” family; in Section 4, I will explain 
the mutual influence between Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, probably her most famous 
colleague, showing analogies and differences about their respective capability/capabilities 
approach, including her own topics, like relational goods, feminism and compassion; even, 
Section 5 will be devoted to  Emma Rothschild, his third wife, and her analysis of the warmness 
of economics sentiments as dynamism of economic agents; finally, in Section 6, I will proceed with an overview about the most important female Sen’s scholars, discussing the schools of 
thoughts which were born through their perspectives on his thought. Then, some final remarks.  
        The main result of this paper is that, on the one hand, Sen has favoured the enhancement 
of these female’s figures both in economics and philosophy; on the other, these female’s figures 
have undoubtedly and significantly influenced his own thought.  Thus, it is better to talk of a 
mutual and peer influence to each other. 
 
2. Joan Robinson: her positivist view of ethics within a non-conventional “mainstream” 
framework  
         I would define Sen’s intellectual relationship with Joan Robinson a long “love-hate” tale, 
where the latter would have wanted that the former had studied “serious economics” like 
capital theory, distribution theory and growth theory. On the flip side, he preferred Maurice Dobb’s methodological approach, more engaged in normative questions concerning economics, 
but he has never forgotten Robinson’s significant role, given origins to a slippery slop about his 
position compared to “mainstream economics”.  
       In 1953, when had arrived at the Trinity College, Sen met the most important economists 
of those years (Gaertner and Pattanaik, 1988): in particular, neoclassical scholars, like Peter 
Bauer, Michael Farrel and Harry Johnson, and Keynesians, like Richard Kahn, Nicholas Kaldor 
and Joan Robinson (Gilardone, 2008). This is the first significant female figure in Sen’s 
intellectual life. In 1922, Joan went to Cambridge for studying economics, while women had 
been just admitted to degree courses (Marcuzzo, Pasinetti and Roncaglia, 1996). In those years, 
she became very famous thanks to her deep insight about Alfred Marshall’s thought, extending 
his analysis with imperfect competition. In turn, she had collaborated with John Maynard Keynes for the “Cambridge Circus” (Harcourt, Kerr, 2009), then quarrelling the validity of 
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neoclassical aggregate production function2. After Sen’s second year in Cambridge, Robinson 
became one of his PhD supervisors, together with Amiya Dasgupta who initiated him to 
economics when he was in India (Klamer, 1989).  
      At that time, Sen was still really committed about welfare economics and the possibility of 
dialogue between ethics and economics: this is the reason why, during those Cambridge days, 
he enforced his friendship with Dobb, Marxist and scholar in political economy. Oddly enough, 
he was the only one who accepted to compare with him about Arrow (1951) impossibility 
theorem, although he was mainly interested in their relevance in non-formal terms, instead of 
their algebra elements (Erasmo, 2020c). On the contrary, Robinson discouraged Sen interests in welfare economics “which she thought was all non-sense” (Klamer 1989, p. 139). In 
particular, as Sen emphasized, she acquired 
 
 <<a naively positivist view of ethics, and was bored by discussion on well-being, social 
judgments and normative evaluations. She wanted to get me away from all the “ethical rubbish”. Maurice Dobb was much more encouraging, and was more open-minded about my interest in ethics and welfare economics. (…) Joan thought that my interest in welfare 
economics and social choice theory reflected a clear failure to grasp what was really 
important.>> (Klamer, 1989, p.139).  
 
Recently, Sen has come back on those Cambridge’s years in a very recent interview and he 
availed of even stronger words for remembering his PhD supervisor: 
 I don’t know how to describe a person as other than “vigorously intolerant” when she told me, as my PhD supervisor, that “I have read the first chapter and a part of the second, and it’s the kind of thing that will be praised by established economists, and you will have no difficulty in getting your PhD.” At Cambridge, your supervisor is not one of your examiners, unlike in America. She said, “I’m not going to read the rest of your thesis.” I said, “But you’re 
supposed to say that the thesis is fit to be submitted for the PhD.” She said, “I will say it.” So I asked her, “On what basis?” “On the basis of what I have read already (…)  It’s good. Clearly, clearly, it’s good. Good in the way that these people understand it. But it’s not worthy of you. 
(Sen, Deaton and Besley, 2020, p. 6) 
 
     After the Cambridge’s years, Robinson’s criticism towards Sen had never stopped for a while, 
even between the Sixties and the Seventies, when he became a very famous economist, refusing 
his main research interests and his methodology. I claim that this passage should be mentioned 
entirely in block quotation, availing of Sen’s own words:  
 
while I was doing the Collective Choice book, she wrote me a letter asserting that I had told 
her that when I finished this book, I would come back and do some serious economics. I 
could not, of course, have said anything like that, and she must have extrapolated some 
peace-making remark I had made. She did hope that I would get back to what she took to be 
serious economics. Capital theory, growth theory, distribution theory, those were just about 
the only central issues to her. (Klamer, 1989, p.139).  
 
    I think it is straightforward how Joan Robinson would have been delighted by Sen’s 
conversion to her research themes. Instead, his disagreement with her approach is evident and 
well represented by his analysis of the Dobb-Robinson’s debate about the labour theory of 
value. According to her, value might not help economists, it is simply a word, defining Marx’s 
use of the labour theory of value as: “metaphysical; it provides a typical example of the way 
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metaphysical ideas operate. Logically it is a mere rigmarole of words, but for Marx it was a flood 
of illumination and for latter-day Marxists, a source of inspiration” (Robinson, 1964, p. 39, cited  
by Sen, 1978, p. 175). In a nutshell, the sense of this statement is the following: Marx’s use of the labour theory of value is “metaphysical” because is not capable of being tested, complying 
to Karl Popper’s  criterion for propositions that not belong to empirical domain. In turn, these propositions are defined as a “rigmarole of words” because they are unscientific. Even, when 
Robinson was talking about latter-day Marxists’, she referred to Dobb. However, as Sen 
emphasized, her analysis was in line with other economists “who are sympathetic to Marx but find his labour theory of value to be an albatross round the neck” (Sen, 1978, p 176). According to Sen, Robinson’s main limit is to avoid a descriptive non-metaphysical interpretation of Marx’s labour theory of value, focusing on predictive and normative interpretations only3, then 
rejecting both. 
     On the contrary, Sen appreciated Dobb (1937, 1973) interpretation of Marx’s use of the 
theory of value where he offered a descriptive perspective about it. In this respect, “describe” 
involves a selection from the set of factual statements where some of them are chosen, others 
ignored. Selection is a seminal moment of description, this is not a metaphysical activity, like 
Robinson claimed. About Dobb’s understanding of Marx’s use of the labour theory of value, the 
object of description is the activity of production. This allows to describe <<the process of 
exchange (…) in terms of relations between persons through personal participation in the production of commodities that are being exchanged. (…) Exchange of commodities is seen as “a definite social relations between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things”(Marx, 1887, p. 43 quoted in Sen, 1978, p. 177)>>. Through Dobb 
(1973), labour comes back to be a human productive activity where exploitation is neither “metaphysical” nor an ethical judgment, opposite than the abovementioned Robinson’s 
perspective (Erasmo, 2020c): rather, this is a factual description of a  socio-economic 
relationship (Sen, 1978). Instead, the aims of this descriptive analysis of Marx’s use of the 
labour theory of value are, on the one hand, predictive, given the possibility to avail of the “law of value” for predicting prices, profits and wages; on the other, normative, as personal 
participation could be understood as the basis of entitlement of the production. Close to Dobb’s 
ideas, Sen concluded how this use is not metaphysical, as Robinson supported. 
        This conflictual relationship with Robinson is confirmed in his very nice paper, On some 
Debates in Capital Theory (1974), where economics and Hindu mythology met together in an 
extraordinary narrative plot. In this “economic parable”, Sen sent Subhuti, reborn as an 
economist specialized in capital theory, to Buddha for finding for his unsolved questions about 
capital measurement and growth (Ghosh, 2006). After analysing the position acquired by those “Venerables” scholars in this filed (like Geoffrey Harcourt, Robert Solow, Paul Samuelson, David 
Champernowne, Piero Sraffa, Pierangelo Garegnani, Irving Fisher and Maurice Dobb, of course), 
the last mentioned economist is Joan Robinson. In this regard, Subhuti pointed out two remarks, 
respectively about positive and normative dimensions concerning the abovementioned topics. 
About the former which Subhuti called Remark 1, he is wondering :”when there is persistent 
unemployment in a stagnant economy the redundant workers may take to employing 
themselves with tiny quantities of capital (say as shoeblacks or pedlars)", however, having said 
something like this, he felt: <<a great relief in not finding Venerable Joan Robinson within 
                                                             
3 Following a predictive interpretation, Robinson concentrated on a theory of value understood as a theory of price where “value” became the labour-time needed to produce a commodity reason why commodities are exchanged 
at prices which are proportional to their value (Sen, 1978). This makes a metaphysical proposition a hypothesis. 
Instead, according to a normative interpretation, Robinson refused Myrdal (1953) interpretation for which labour has the right to the whole product, considering profit as “an illegitimate exploitation”. On the contrary, she considered Marx’s theory of value what “accounts for exploitation” (Robinson, 1964, p. 36). 
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earshot. She would have never forgiven me for referring to "tiny quantities of capital>> (Sen, 
1974, p. 334) This passage well-represent her uncompromising nature in intellectual debate. 
        Subhuti relaunched, asking Buddha: “what will I do when I meet Venerable Joan Robinson 
and feel a compulsion to make a Remark like this ?” (Sen, 1974, p. 334). This back-and-forth 
ought to be mentioned in full quotation:  
 “That, first of all, is your problem. Second, be bold. And third, why do you think Venerable Joan 
Robinson will object to your remark? She will not. Subhuti said: She will of course. She does not like 
references to "quantities of capital"—tiny or large. I shall surely run into her someday. How will I 
defend Remark 1, then? Tell me, O Enlightened One. Buddha replied: She will know, of course, that 
Remark 1 is a quotation from pages 157-158 of her Accumulation of Capital. Curious that you should 
have had the same thought. (Sen, 1974, p. 334) 
 
         Although Sen had a critical relationship with Robinson, preferring Dobb, he recognized his 
(partial) debt compared to her tradition. And this position has been a source of an interesting 
quarrel between two female economists, namely Emmanuelle Bénicourt and Ingrid Robeyns. 
This latter will be deepened in Section 6, being one of the most important Sen’s contemporary 
scholars. At the centre of their debate there is a methodological question, namely considering 
Sen as a mainstream economist or not. Indeed, Bénicourt claimed how Sen was awarded with the Nobel Prize for his “very mainstream contributions to standard economics-particularly for 
his work on Social Choice” (Bénicourt, 2002). According to her, Sen was not realizing a “de-autistification” of economics: although his capability approach has been understood as a shift 
compared to this route, she emphasized how this system is only a variation of mainstream 
perspective, referring to his Commodities and Capabilities for supporting this hypothesis. I will 
not in further details about her analysis, but I would only mention this strong passage where 
Bénicourt defined Sen as a very orthodox economist: in his co-authored book with Dréze, India, 
economic development and social opportunity (1995), Sen mentioned Solow’s works in a 
footnote, especially his 1956 model, as well as further explorations of elder neoclassical models, 
like those of Robert Barro, Paul Krugman, Robert Lucas, Nicholas Mankiw, Paul Romer and 
David Weil, linking his works with this tradition. Even stronger is this nice passage where 
Benicourt stated how:  
 
<<Sen is not an opponent of the mainstream approach, and that, on the contrary, he 
considers these theories as constituting great progress in the understanding of concrete 
economic and social issues. In fact, Sen himself declared openly last year, in a conference 
organised by the OFCE (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques): “I am a 
mainstream economist”>> (Benicourt, 2002) 
  
     On the contrary, Robeyns’ reply was focused on showing how capability approach is not an 
example of standard mainstream economics. Indeed, not only this approach is developing a 
framework which allows to meet different scholars and policy makers ideas, but connecting 
theoretical and empirical problems, making simultaneously economics a human and social 
science. All these elements confirm how far is Sen’s methodology compared to mainstream 
economics. Certainly, on the one hand, Robeyns recognized that Sen wrote several 
contributions with highly mathematical character; but, on the other, she pointed out how he 
criticized the most important cores of neoclassical theory, for example, self-interested 
behaviours or optimization in decision-making. Availing of a mathematical approach does not 
equal with an adhesion to mainstream economics. I think this quotation is enlightening in order 
to grasp where this misunderstanding about Sen’s methodology locates. Although Sen defined himself as “a mainstream economist, he has added that for him that mainstream is economics 
in the tradition of Joan Robinson, Marx, Kaldor and so forth. Thus, when Sen calls himself a 
mainstream economist, he is trying to rescue economics from the narrow-minded, imperialist 
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discipline that it has become” (Robeyns, 2002). I agree with Robeyns’ clarification4: Sen availed of the word “mainstream economics” assigning it a different meaning compared to the 
traditional literature. And this use is a recognition of his (partial) debt with his PhD supervisor, 
Joan Robinson, although he has always felt closer to Maurice Dobb among those Cambridge’s 
economists5.  
 
3. Eva Colorni:  the extraordinary perspective of the “Colorni-Hirschman-Spinelli” family  
      In 1973, Sen had married Eva Colorni who prematurely died in 1985 because of a stomach 
cancer. Eva’s figure may apparently seem different from the other female economists and 
philosophers I am analysing in this paper. At a first sight, she did not write anything decisive 
for economics. However, she studied Law, Philosophy and Economics (in Delhi and Pavia) and 
was lecturer at the London Polytechnic. Sen paid a tribute to Eva in his autobiography wrote in 
occasion of his Nobel Prize (Cot, 2013). Quoting the more significant words towards her:  
 “In the reorientation of my research, I benefited greatly from discussions with my wife, Eva Colorni (…). She exercised a great influence on the standards and reach that I attempted to achieve in my 
work (often without adequate success). Eva was very supportive of my attempt to use a broadened 
framework of social choice theory in a variety of applied problems: to assess poverty; to evaluate 
inequality; to clarify the nature of relative deprivation; to develop distribution-adjusted national 
income measures; to clarify the penalty of unemployment; to analyse violations of personal liberties 
and basic rights; and to characterize gender disparities and women’s relative disadvantage.” (Sen, 
1998 in Cot, 2013) 
 
       Surely, Eva’s influence on Sen is autobiographical, before than intellectual, as well as her 
role was not exclusive, considering her important origins which enabled him to know new 
perspectives, those of the “Hirschman-Colorni-Spinelli” family. As Sen claimed in Individual 
Freedom as a Social Commitment (1990a), he has met Italian politics through Eva’s eyes, in 
particular, liberal socialism (Erasmo, 2019b). Since her experience, Sen looked at the Italian 
politics as anti-authoritarian and socially committed, establishing a significant relation with 
Italian economists too. Certainly, he was lucky to have the uncommon outlook of this extended 
family with strong political awareness where socialism prevailed.  
      Eva was the daughter of Eugenio Colorni, cousin of Piero Sraffa and philosopher and Italian 
partisan martyr, and Ursula Hirschman, sister of Albert Hirschman, as Sen (2014) has recently 
emphasized in his speech in his honour held in Rome at the “Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei”.  
All those relationships enlightened and delighted his life (Sen, 1998). In particular, in this Rome’s speech, Sen admitted how he has appreciated Hirschman’s The Passions and the 
Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (1979). It is not a case, he 
provided an “Afterword” for its 2013 edition with Emma Rothschild. In line with Sen, as we will 
see better in Section 5, Hirschman (1979) himself was in debt with Nicolas de Condorcet and 
found in his thought further and richer motivations for human behaviours compared to those 
                                                             
4 In this article, Robeyns (2002) remembered Sen’s engagement with non-traditional economic view, like the “Cambridge Journal of Economics”, his support to the International Association for Feminist Economics and its 
journal. 
5 Indeed, always in the abovementioned recent interview, Sen clarified how they had a “odd relationship with her”, but he “liked her very much” (Sen, Deaton and Besley, p.6). Indeed, Robinson asked him to read one chapter of her 
new book The Accumulation of Capital (1956) every week, then discuss those topics with her in his supervision 
time, instead of his writing essays for her. Finally, Sen told her he did not appreciate so much her book because of 
it was too much on minor questions in capital theory, while too little about capital and economy in more general terms. Although Sen was totally “unable to make Joan see what I was trying to say, but she was—and I appreciated 
this fondly—keen on getting me right whenever we disagreed. (…) She was always keen on arguing with me—to 




considered in mainstream economics6. In this way, it is possible to reach a more complex 
understanding of human nature in economics (Chakraborty, 1998): on the contrary, 
mainstream economics imperialism impoverished economics, especially, the properness of an 
economic based on market which was weakened by its own claims.  
        According to Sen, among many other results, Hirschman’s main credit was his deep insight 
about limits and opportunity concerning the market: about the former, Hirschman pointed out 
several observations about the seminal role of human relationships and how these might 
challenge conventional economics about market dynamics; on the other, he understood 
positive markets results better than its common supporters. In this direction, Sen suggested 
how Hirschman recovered even Montesquieu (1748) theory, complying to which the market has the advantage to “mitigate” evil impulses. In particular, Hirschman worked on a classical, but underdeveloped theme, namely the existence of passions which may lead people to “bad” 
actions in the market, although they have interest to not behave like this. Since this assumption, 
Sen (2014) stressed how he meant the market not in terms of economic efficiency, but as an 
effort to remove individuals by those violent impulses and divisive force, like nationalism, 
racism and religious intolerance in their own community. Against that economic 
impoverishment caused by economic imperialism favoured by mainstream economics, like Sen, 
Hirschman’s peculiar view of the market tried to enrich economics, as social sciences, with 
cultural, political and social values. This element confirms the will not only of a more complex 
understanding of individuals in economics, rather major epistemological complexity in economics too. I claim how “complexity” and the will to “enrich economics” are the real 
common elements which Sen and Hirschman shared.  
        After Eugenio Colorni’s death, Ursula Colorni secondly married Altiero Spinelli, the 
ideologist of the European Federalist Movement and one of the future godfather of the 
European Union  (Rossi and Spinelli, 1944). Sen (2014) has remembered they had significant 
comparison about freedom. Instead, Eva Colorni’s own ideas, she embodied these rich cultural 
and human background: she was engaged with how to safeguard freedom of most deprived 
people and claimed how inequalities makes people closer than slavery (Erasmo, 2019b). Sen 
has always been very interested in these themes, before and after his encounter with the 
Hirschman-Colorni-Spinelli family: indeed, since the ending of Sixties, before he met Eva, Sen 
had been committed with social justice, joining a course about this topic together with excellent 
scholars like Arrow and Rawls (Gilardone, 2015)      
       Yet, one of his bigger masterpiece on the theme, Development as Freedom (1999) was 
written after their significant encounter: thus, we might not exclude a debt, although not 
exclusive, with Eva Colorni comparing the topics faced in this essay (which are the same he 
emphasized how she influenced him in his autobiography wrote in occasion of his Nobel Prize).  
 
4. Martha Nussbaum: her Aristotelian capabilities approach and her focus on relational 
goods, feminism and compassion  
                                                             
6 We will not enter with further details about their analogies and differences, but one ought to be clarified, being  
methodological: Sen is mainly interested in creating watershed between ethics and economics, while Hirschman 
focused mainly on new link between economics and politics. Hence, their respective fields are enough different, but they have in common the will to fight against any kind of “economic imperialism” in favour of multidisciplinary 
and dialogue beyond traditional disciplinary borders. Although this joint element, Sen has probably had a bigger 
consensus compared to Hirschman: this latter intentionally avoided to be identified with a specific economic 
traditions, refusing every kind of label, acquiring a certain nebulousness around his role in academic world. For 




       In this paper, the analysis of the intellectual relationship and mutual influence between 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum will be shorter than it should be, but a similar comparison 
would be too much long and the available literature on the theme is rich and varied (Alexander, 
2008; Fabre and Miller, 2003; Maboloc, 2008; Magni, 2019). Probably, this is the most 
important relationship Sen has established with a female scholar, in this case, a philosopher, 
instead of an economist, like the others colleagues here considered. The most important work 
they wrote together is the essay The Quality of Life (1993), but there are also shorter 
contribution, like Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions (1987). Martha Nussbaum 
has become one of the most famous contemporary female philosopher not only thanks to this 
co-authored volume, but for her personal development of Sen’s capability approach in an 
extremely original way. Actually, she is the second President of HDCA, after Amartya Sen (Basu, 
Kanbur and Robeyns, 2019). According to a historical perspective, Sen (1980) has been the 
pioneer of capability approach7 (Chiappero-Martinetti, Osmani and Qizilbash, 2020), but 
Nussbaum has expanded and made it more applicable both in economics and other fields. 
Maybe, all the operative studies about capability approach are more indebted with her 
methodology compared to his. Their respective approach have both analogies and differences, 
but it is enough complex to define well-defined borders between these two elements.  
         About the most straightforward analogies, there are, under a methodological profile, their 
common understanding of capability approach as a realistic framework for studying human life, 
in particular individual welfare and social states, from a different perspective compared to 
those prevailing in philosophy and economics; under a socioeconomic profile, they share the 
idea who human themselves ought to avail of their own strength in order to improve their life. Sen’s capability approach’s core ideas are those of functioning and capability: the former refers 
to “an achievement of a person: “what he or she manages to do or to be”, as well as <<a part of the “state” of that person>>, but it ought “to be distinguished from the commodities which are 
used to achieve those functioning” (Sen, 1985a, p. 10)8. Instead, the latter are about “those 
beings and doings that constitute human life and that are central to our understandings of 
ourselves as human beings9”, as Robeyns (2017, p. 39) emphasized. In particular, capabilities 
is the set of alternative functionings who an individual owns, representing his/her concrete 
freedom to choose between different possible combinations of functionings in order to improve 
his/her condition.  
       In this last decade, however, a decisive clarification about capability approach has been 
made by Sen himself: I claim how this represents an epic breaking point compared to the 
available literature, as we will deepen in Section 6. In the interview with Baujard, Gilardone and 
Salles (2010), Sen claimed with a certain strength:  
 << ‘I have to rescue myself by saying [thumping table] “I’m not a capability theorist! For god’s sake, I’m not a capability theorist”  (Sen in Baujard, Gilardone & Salles, 2010) The 
evident disagreement between Amartya Sen and his commentators regarding the status of 
capability is puzzling, and cries out for a clarification of the role of capability in his theory 
of justice>> (Baujard and Gilardone, 2017, p. 1)  
 
                                                             
7 Sen elaborated explicitly the capability approach in his Tanner Lecture, “Equality of What?” (1980). However, 
Erasmo (2019c) showed how he began to develop those topics which will lead to capability approach since the 
Seventies through his main interlocutors during those years, namely Arrow, Rawls and Harsanyi.   
8 Functionings are an “a posteriori” compared to commodities, as these latter are used to achieve the former. 
9
 Robeyns (2017) has decided to focus exclusively on human functionings and capabilities in her recent book, 
remembering how Nussbaum extended capability approach to non-human functionings and capabilities, thus, 
including non-human animals in her analysis.  
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       Since this interview, Baujard and Gilardone (2017) have concluded how capability 
approach acquires mainly a heuristic value in Sen’s thought10. This statement sheds a different 
light either on him and Martha Nussbaum. It is not a case, well before this clarification, she has 
preferred to talk about “capabilities approach” (Nussbaum, 2000, 2011) using the plural form, 
instead of “capability approach”, like Sen (Gasper, 2007), for differing her approach to his and 
better explaining how her capabilities are qualitatively plural and quantitatively different. This 
is a first difference between them.  
         Another one might be Sen’s explicit refusal to offer a well-define and detailed list of 
capabilities (Sen, 2004) who every individual should have around the world (Guna Saigaran, 
Karupiah and Gopal, 2013). Indeed, Sen (1988) has supported how his focus on basic 
capabilities is oriented to specify exclusively a space where evaluations about well-being might 
be located, rather than proposing a specific formula for them (Déneulin, 2002). In turn, he 
claimed how the choice of the most relevant capabilities will depend on social concerns and 
values. This position may be explained through Sen’s pluralism, according to which 
functionings will have different priority and importance in different socioeconomic realities 
(Sen, 1999). Sen’s capability approach does not pretend to provide an exhaustive evaluation of 
those capabilities should be promoted (Déneulin, 2002), but to offer a framework for evaluating 
if people have concretely the opportunities to exercise their relevant capabilities  (Desai, 1990; 
Qizilbash, 1996, Sudgen 1993).  
       On the contrary, Nussbaum (2000) elaborated an objective list of capabilities, confirming 
her will to use the plural form of this concept, at the aim to offer a more applicable and realistic 
framework for evaluating individual’s well-being. Her central human capabilities are those of 
life; bodily health; bodily integrity; sense, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; 
affiliation; other species; play and political and material control over individual own 
environment (Guna Saigaran, Karupiah and Gopal, 2013).  In turn, Nussbaum has enriched her 
capabilities approach with Aristotelian and Marxian elements about human flourishing and 
well-being (Gasper, 1997; Déneulin, 2013). Indeed, Sen has highlighted how: 
 
<<at the time of proposing the [capability]approach, I did not manage to seize on its 
Aristotelian connections>> (Sen, 1993a, p. 30, n.2). He adds, however, that <<the most 
powerful conceptual connections of the capability approach] would appear to be with the 
Aristotelian view of the human good>> (Sen, 1993a, p. 46) . He observes, justly, that [t]he 
Aristotelian perspective  and its connections with the recent attempts at constructing a 
capability-focused approach have been illuminatingly discussed by Martha Nussbaum 
>>(Sen, 1993a, p. 46)  (Walsh, 2003, p. 379) 
 
    In this passage, Walsh was quoting an interesting passage of The Quality of Life (1993) where 
he clarified how the Aristotelian reading of capability approach characterized mainly her 
approach, instead of his. I think how this statement is oriented to reaffirm how original and 
innovative is his own capability approach, instead being indebted with the Ancient 
philosophical tradition. Even, Nussbaum (1985, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993) is totally engaged with 
Aristotelian philosophical tradition. 
           And this involvement is fully proved about individuals’ “good life”11: Sen and Nussbaum 
availed respectively of two different concepts, namely “human fulfilment” and “human 
                                                             
10
 I will not deepen more this topic, given that it would be go beyond the aim of this paper and still exists an 
evaluable development of this analysis about Sen’s theory of justice, namely Baujard and Gilardone (2020). 
11 The Aristotelian Greek word for explaining good life is eudaimonia. This word acquires a double value in his 
thought: on the one hand, an ethical value, referring to the realization of a plurality of personal “capabilities” thanks 
to the exercise of phronesis, such as wisdom, able to direct actions towards the goal of happiness, in a certain 
horizon of sense; on the other, a social value, without ignoring interpersonal relationships and the practice of 
philia, the friendship.  
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flourishing”. But this latter linguistical choice mirrors one more time her debt with Aristotle 
and Greek tradition. Although the linguistical difference, these two expressions show the same 
full development of individual capabilities, reaching the highest form of self-realization. 
According to Giovanola (2005, 2007), the normative criterion for explaining Sen’s human 
fulfilment is embodied by anthropological richness. This latter ought to be understood through 
the continuous and dynamic building of individual identity where interpersonal relationships, 
namely those an individual establishes with the others, have a crucial, but not exclusive role. 
This role assigned to interpersonal relationships is close to that friendship (or “philia”) to which 
Nussbaum refers with her close Aristotelian “human flourishing”.  
        But Martha Nussbaum is not only famous for her “Aristotelian” capabilities approach, 
indeed, she goes beyond Amartya Sen’s thought: she is also one of the godmother of relational 
goods, an exponent of universalist feminism (Erasmo, 2020b), careful to individual specificities, 
but focusing on vulnerability and compassion. Nussbaum (1986) has introduced the term “relational goods” almost simultaneously with other authors, like Donati (1986), Gui (1987) 
and Uhlaner (1989). These goods are non-instrumental relationships oriented to satisfy that 
human need of social interaction12: a relational good “is” and “expresses” the relationship itself 
between individuals13. Her understanding of relational goods is complex, but it might be 
summarized through the categories of reciprocity, persistence, motivation and 
indispensability14 (Erasmo, 2019a).  
Nussbaum (2002) is also a committed feminist, supporting a universalism which is 
neither insensitive to differences nor imperialist: rather she has offered an ideal framework 
for analysing gender differences since her capabilities approach, elements which are not so 
seminal in Sen. In general, she is engaged in all individual specificities: in particular, 
Nussbaum is careful to that vulnerability which characterizes children, illnesses and elder. 
According to her perspective, a theory of social justice might not avoid these categories: in 
this way, Nussbaum has shown a certain criticism towards those liberal theory of justice, 
as the Rawlsian one, as they grasp dignity, individual moral capacity and physical world as 
something different (Erasmo, 2020b). On the contrary, her Kantian universalism makes 
Nussbaum (1994) theory of justice careful to others, which are morally relevant, while their 
specificities are morally irrelevant compared to those moral obligations we have compared 
to them. Since her position, it follows an individual commitment compared to human beings 
all. 
         Considering these elements, perhaps the main difference between Sen and Nussbaum is 
her care about vulnerability which leads her to develop the theme of compassion, absent in his 
thought. Since her capabilities approach, Nussbaum has tried to rehabilitate the emotions in 
economic field. On the contrary, Sen’s sentiments have exclusively an economic nature, deriving 
from the dynamism of economic actions, as we will see in Section 5. Nussbaum questioned the 
rehabilitation of moral sentiments, distancing herself both from the classical problem of emotions’ irrationality and the difficulty to convert them into actions. In this space of the 
rediscovery of sentiments, she considers fundamental compassion (Nussbaum, 1996), given its 
ethical, moral and political value (Boella, 2006). 
                                                             
12 For a more exhaustive analysis of relational goods, including their positional value, see Fiorito and Vatiero 
(2013). 
13
 This is a new kind of economic good, differing those goods where: on the one hand, the quality of the relationship 
between individuals is seminal; on the other, economic good and relationship are distinguished to each other, like 
in personal services (Bruni and Zamagni, 2004). 
14
 In a nutshell, these relational goods survive until a relationship exists: thus, “reciprocity” is fundamental for their “persistence”. Instead, “motivation” is fundamental in order to distinguish a relational goods from a simple 
instrumental relationship. Finally, the individuals involved in this relationship are indispensable: whether they 
change, it will be another different relational good. 
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        In her analysis, Nussbaum has focused both on compassion and empathy: however, I have 
decided to deepen mainly the former, given that the latter would require a longer analysis 
compared to that may provide in a section15. Through compassion, Nussbaum is close to 
Aristotle and Hellenistic tradition, as individuals are not impartial spectators in front of other 
pains and sufferings, rather a sympathetic spectator, like in Aristotelian tragedy. Furthermore, 
compassion has an ethical value which allows to establish a link with others thanks to what may be defined as “concreteness of human condition”. In Upheavals of Thought (2001), 
Nussbaum explained how compassion is an emotion which might create a physiological and 
natural watershed with others, bringing morality in bodily dimension, with its set of needs and 
weaknesses. Certainly, compassion does not equal with feeling other pains or sufferings, but we 
may understand their conditions because of the awareness of our own vulnerability. This 
partial identification with others is possible thanks to empathy. Since this latter, we can express 
this insight of others’ condition through our evaluative judgements, given this relationship 
between cognitive and ethical-moral dimensions.  
        These are further, significant differences compared to Sen which makes Nussbaum’s 
thought original and distinct from his: on the one hand, in Sen’s thought, a similar attention to 
bodily dimension is absent, maybe, due to Nussbaum’s more philosophical perspective; on the 
other, in turn, in front of human pains and sufferings, Sen’s economic agents perceived them 
through commitment, as a simple sense of duty to act in order to fight injustice. Indeed, Sen has 
a strong ethical sense, but his morality does not have any corporeity, opposite to Nussbaum 
more complete approach to these topics.  
 
5. Emma Rothschild: the warmness of economic sentiments as dynamism of economic 
agents  
       In 1991, Amartya Sen married Emma Rothschild, his third wife, a British economic 
historian, professor of History at Harvard University. Among her main interests, there are 
figures like those of Nicolas de Condorcet and Adam Smith. Her role was fundamental in order 
to get Sen closer to the former (Caruso, 2002), after Hirschman’s contribution16, as seen in 
Section 3. Simultaneously, Sen influenced Rothschild in her masterpiece Economic Sentiments: 
Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment (2001). In turn, her reading is seminal for 
understanding Sen’s debt compared to the theory of moral sentiments. So, they mutually 
influenced to each other, thanks to their relationship which is not only human, but intellectual.  
        Significantly devoted to Sen, Rothschild (2001) tries to subtract Smith to that thread who 
saw him as the prophet of homo economicus, like On Ethics and Economics (Sen, 1987), but 
returning his more authentically human essence. Differently from Sen’s reading, she considered 
an under-developed theme, namely Condorcet’s role in economic Enlightenment. Together with 
Smith, indeed, Condorcet was an exponent of what she defined ‘warm Enlightenment of economic sentiments’. But we have to proceed gradually. In Economic Sentiments, Rothschild 
explained the reasons why Condorcet and Smith do not have had great fortune since the XIXth 
century, both subject to a misleading reading, being respectively accused to be a utopian 
rationalist and a reductionist (Ciocca, Galli, Rothschild and Zamagni, 2004). This unproper 
reading is probably due to the weaking of institutions during the rise of neoliberalism, opposite 
to Condorcet and Smith politics which assigned an important role to State. In her essay, 
Rothschild would preserve these authors from a misleading understanding through a double 
                                                             
15
 For further details, see Carr (1999); Crisp (2008).  





reading: on the one hand, based on proximity, where authors are analysed in their own context; 
on the other, based on distance, locating them in the historical logics of their time, but providing 
an imagine able to overcome that apparent dichotomy between the cold light of reason and the 
warmness of economic life. About this latter, Rothschild wanted to distance her reading from 
that Enlightenment’s understanding for which rationality is indifferent and uniform, ‘cold’, at 
the goal to make economic life and judgments expressed by individuals in their relationships 
(including trading) a matter of sentiments.   
         Before deepening the value of “coldness”, I would clarify the meaning of economic 
sentiments in her thought. When Rothschild talked about these “economic sentiments”, she did 
not to refer to a sort of Leopardian romantic sentimentalism, as she pointed out. Rather, this is 
a contemporary anthropological, economic and moral humanism with radical political 
consequences. Indeed, through this rich analysis, she would solve the difficulty of dialogue 
between institutions, especially market and State, not unlike Sen (1985c). According to Rothschild,  the ‘coldness’ of Enlightenment was described by Hegel (1807) like two different 
kinds of awareness: on the one hand, a discrete, rigid and sought atomism which led to an 
exasperation of individual interests that mainstream economics erroneously associated to 
Smith, looking at him as the prophet of homo economicus, as abovementioned; on the other, a “cold” universality, simple and inflexible, which led to Terror during the French Revolution, the coldest death in Hegel’s reading who his contemporaries associated to the figure of Condorcet, 
considered by them as the Apocalypse of the thought. On the contrary, Rothschild supported that we need to talk about “warm Enlightenment” for referring to these authors: human actions 
derives not only by rationality, but “warm” sentiments.  
          This warmness may be tracked in those motivations beneath decision-making, including 
those selfish and self-referential. Oddly enough, Rothschild incorporated also indirect taxation 
as a matter of sentiments (Condorcet, 1847-1849): complying to her perspective, every 
dynamic economic activity is “sentimental”. I claim how this warmness as dynamism which 
Rothschild found in Smith and Condorcet’s works is the same of Sen’s ‘conception of what people are’17, availing of Davis (2012) significant definition, in particular his ‘anthropological elasticity’. This latter equals with individual opportunity to adapt himself/herself compared to 
the challenges concerning the reality who surrounds him/her, contrarily to that stillness which 
characterizes homo economicus (Erasmo, 2020a). In particular, we might observe a similar 
dynamism within the two main relationships an individual is able to establish (Erasmo, 2020a), 
namely: with his/her self (intrapersonal relationship), modifying his/her motivations 
compared to decision-making taking into account of others’ goal and welfare (Sen, 1977, 
1985b), availing of his/her reflexivity (Davis, 2007); with extra-personal reality, especially with 
others (interpersonal relationship). Hence, what the warm Enlightenment of economic sentiments and Sen’s economic anthropology have in common is that individual behaviours 
derive from changeable motivations, in space and in time, without losing his/her rationality, 
differently from mainstream homo economicus.       
      After this overview about the meaning of “warmth”, I think it is useful to explain better how concretely this Enlightenment realized compared to Rothschild’s reading and why this is close to Amartya Sen’s works. Firstly, this passage realized in Condorcet and Smith’s thought through 
three different levels (Ciocca, Galli, Rothschild, Zamagni, 2004): the first has a moral and social 
character where society is understood as a relational plot thanks to what she defined as 
                                                             
17 This is the way Davis (2012) refers to Sen’s understanding of individuals in his later economic thought. This 
latter has appreciated so much his analysis to reply him with this enthusiastic words  “Among the many important clarifications and assessments that John Davis has provided, the one that is most striking…is his diagnosis that the 
approach presented in The Idea of Justice depends on large part on my ‘conception of what people are’…I do agree with Davis’s diagnosis, and I am very glad that he has helped to bring out sharply something that was too implicit…in my own writing “(Sen, 2012). 
13 
 
‘domestic’ virtues (like mutual confidence and moderation in order to avoid extreme 
behaviours towards the others) which are progressively acquired by society through their 
development itself; the second has an economic value where sentiments equal with interest, 
acquiring the characteristics to be neither exclusive nor conflictual within a society averagely 
developed; the third level has a political character, as it looks at the contradiction of this world 
in the light of the theory of sentiments. Indeed, our world is simultaneously, on the one hand, 
secure, thanks to the domestic virtues which denote a certain anthropological optimism; on the 
other, insecure, because without any dogmas, overshadowed by uncertainty. As Rothschild 
argued, this leads to a double political dynamic: bottom-up, through a discursive and relational 
activity among men; top-down, through legislative and coercive actions  which are fundamental 
in order to create an equilibrium compared to the realization of subjective preferences.  
         I would avail of Rothschild’s reading in order to show  how, in Sen’s thought, there are almost the same elements which leads towards a similar “warm Enlightenment” in 
contemporary age: not differently from Condorcet and Smith, progress is understood by Sen 
(1993) as ‘development’, such as the expansion of individual virtues, through behaviours, for 
example, complying to commitment18. These actions become opportunity for establishing 
relationships which are more than instrumental, rather interpersonal: given that every 
sentiment mirrors individual interests, neither exclusive nor conflictual, cooperative strategies are legitimated, without losing economic agents’ rationality, rediscovering social dimension 
compared to merely economic interests (Davis, 2009); about reality, this is characterized by 
instability, reason why Sen has always refused to write a complete and total list of capabilities, 
considering also how economic agents preferences change. From this dynamism and 
heterogeneity, it follows behavioural unpredictability about Amartya Sen’s economic agents19.  
        Thanks to Rothschild’s reading, it is possible to extend the available literature about the echo of Smith on Sen’s thought (Bréban and Gilardone, 2020; Eiffe, 2010; Walsh, 2000, 2003), 
including also the influence of this warm Enlightenment through this two authors: in a nutshell, 
since her analysis, it is straightforward the contribution of these authors on Sen’s notion of 
human fulfilment and the sense of duty in front human deprivations. Coming back on 
Nussbaum, Sen’s human fulfilment is a condition of Aristotelian happiness, like her human 
flourishing, as abovementioned, but I emphasize his debt with Condorcet and Smith’s 
conception of progress like development. Indeed, human fulfilment is composed of two 
distinguished moments which mutually exercise a feedback to each other: on the one hand, the 
process which leads to human fulfilment, the progress understood as development; on the 
other, the condition of achieved human fulfilment, the Aristotelian happiness. 
         In turn, moral sentiments and economic interests contribute to individual realization in Sen’s thought through those social relationships he/she might establish with others which 
contribute at the flourishing of human existence. In this regard, we might find in Sen the same 
Smithian three levels of analysis: the first is subjective where an individual scrutinizes 
himself/herself for a proper building of his/her identity (Davis, 2007), namely in Sen’s 
intrapersonal relationship (Erasmo, 2020a); the second is intersubjective, where the building 
of individual identity is also produced through the relationships an individual establishes with others, like in Sen’s interpersonal relationships (Erasmo, 2020a); the third is objective about 
                                                             
18 Availing of Sen’s own words: “If the knowledge of torture of others (…) does not make you feel personally worse 
off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment. (Sen, 1977, 
p. 326) 
19
 I agree with Bobulescu and Laudet (2019) about how this instability was not so different from Keynes (1936) 
animal spirits in decision-making, but I would like to develop this question in a successive, more specific work, given that their consideration was indeed born since a seminar I held in Caen about Amartya Sen’s economic 
anthropology which is explicitly mentioned in the abovementioned work. 
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the relationships an individual establishes with institutions, like market and State, as in Sen’s 
extra-personal relationships (Erasmo, 2020a). 
      About the sense of duty in front of human deprivations, these latter are never understood 
as pains and sufferings from which it may follow an emotive recognition of this human 
condition in Condorcet and Smith. They influence only concrete actions in order to stop these 
inequalities, like in Sen (1977, 1985b, 2005b) commitment: this confirms how economic 
feelings are not a sort of emotionality, but the product of individual actions20.  
       Sen’s debt with Smith is also emphasized by Walsh (2003), but availing of a different 
perspective: focusing on Sen’s engagement for a virtuous methodological dialogue between 
positive and normative economics, he defined this approach a “Renaissance or second phase of classical economists” (Walsh, 2003), opposite to “Ricardian minimalism”. According to Walsh’s 
definition, Ricardian minimalism equals with Sen (1987) engineering-based approach which 
avoids normative elements, like Ricardo, Sraffa and von Neumann did. Hence, the Renaissance 
of classical economics is a rediscovery of normative elements within economics which 
corroborated Sen closeness to Smith’s Enlightenment (Erasmo, 2020c). 
       
6. An overview about the most influential female scholars engaged in Sen’s thought: the 
“capability approach-centered perspective” and  the“ capability approach-heuristic 
value” 
      I think that this Section offers the occasion to enhance the works of the most influential female scholars engaged in Sen’s thought and, in turn, to distinguish the main schools of thought 
among the contemporary female available literature. About this latter, I claim we may 
distinguish two different perspectives about Sen’s thought: on the one hand, a “capability 
approach-centered perspective”, born at the beginning of the XXIth  century, mainly focused on 
the analysis and application of his capability approach; on the other, an enough different 
perspective focused, on the contrary, on “capability approach-heuristic value”, arisen very 
recently. Thus, in this Section, I will proceed following a simply historical order compared to 
these two main schools of thought21.  
       At the beginning of the XXIth century, the most important female works concerning Sen’s 
thought were published with a worldwide hit: these successful scholars have been Sabina 
Alkire, Severine Déneulin, Wiebke Kuklys and Ingrid Robeyns. In particular, they have in 
common what I defined a “capability approach-centered perspective”, providing a general 
analysis of its meaning and affording a quantitative application to specific economic questions, 
like human development, inequalities, poverty, social justice, just to mention a few.  
      In alphabetic order, Sabina Alkire, University of Oxford, is an economist: her doctoral thesis, 
Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction (2002) showed how Sen’s 
capability approach may be coherently and practically employed in order to reduce poverty. 
Successively, she has continued to work about capability approach and poverty in quantitative 
terms: indeed, together with James Foster, Alkire developed the so-called “Alkire Foster Method”, a method for measuring multidimensional poverty, including the range of 
deprivations they suffer and aggregating those information about society poverty (Alkire and 
Forster, 2011; Alkire, S. , Foster, J., Seth S., Santos M. E., Roche J. and Ballon, P, 2015). Actually, 
she is the director of the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), established 
at the University of Oxford in 2007. She is also a fellow of the Human Development and 
                                                             
20
 Probably, an interesting criticism might be addressed to Sen for his lack about emotions in the traditional sense 
of the world.  
21
 I clarify how this is not an exhaustive lists of all the female scholars engaged in Sen’s analysis: in this sense, I 
think it would be evaluable a whole, more comprehensive paper devoted to a similar enquiry in order to highlight all the different, multidisciplinary researches born since Sen’s works. 
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Capability Approach (HDCA). Among her further activities, there are her engagement with the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, the European Commission, the UK’s Department for International Development and the United Nations 
Human Development Programme Human Development Report Office. One of her co-authors is another important Sen’s female scholar, Severine Déneulin, University of Bath: she is an 
economist, interested in Amartya Sen’s capability approach and development issues. Among 
her most famous works, there are An introduction to the Human Development and Capability 
Approach: Freedom and Agency (2009), written with Lila Shahani, devoted to social sciences 
scholar and development practitioners, and Well-being, justice and development ethics (2014) 
at the goal of providing a wide overview about human development and capability debates. 
        Instead, Wiebke Kuklys, Cambridge University, was an economist who prematurely and 
tragically disappeared in 2005, at the age of 33, few months after having defended her PhD 
dissertation which was published posthumously, Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach: 
Theoretical Insights and Empirical Applications. This essay is still one of the most complete for 
deepening theoretical and empirical elements concerning Sen’s capability approach. In her 
brief, but significant life, among her credits, Kuklys extended the capability approach through 
the application of new statistical techniques22.  Thanks to her open-minded thinking, she 
combined new ideas with a special care for the most fragile people (Kuklys, 2004, 2005). 
        Then, Ingrid Robeyns, Utrecht University, is both an economist and a philosopher : her 
doctorate thesis was entitled Gender Inequality: A Capability Perspective. Her PhD supervisor 
was Sen himself. In her long career, she has focused mainly on capability approach, as well as 
in social justice and desirable institutional change. Her most important work is Well-being, 
Freedom and Social Justice: the Capability Approach Re-rexamined (2017). Among her activities, 
she is Past President of the HDCA association and she is actually director of the “Fair Limits Project” which analyses distributive rule which ought to be upper limits about those resources 
it is morally and ethically acceptable to have, following a multidisciplinary approach which 
spaces from philosophy of distributive justice to non-liberal and/or non-Western approaches. 
      In this space of female scholars engaged his Sen’s capability approach, there is also Enrica 
Chiappero-Martinetti, University of Pavia, an economist who has applied capability approach, 
in an extremely original way, to fuzzy logic: her earlier studies about the topic dated back to 
1994, with the pioneering paper A new approach to evaluation of well-being and poverty by fuzzy 
set theory. She is the current editor of the “Journal of Human Development and Capabilities”. I 
have decided to analyse this figure apart from the others because her approach differs from the 
other abovementioned scholars for this different application in fuzzy logic. Recently, together with Osmani and Qizilbash, two of the most influential scholars of Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach, she has published an essay The Cambridge Handbook of Capability Approach (2020). 
        An important and reversal compared to this “capability approach-centered perspective” is 
represented by Antoinette Baujard and Muriel Gilardone’s works. In particular, Baujard, 
University of Lyon, is an economist and Deputy Director of GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne: her main 
research fields ranges from voting experiments and social choice theory to philosophy and 
methodology of normative issues, including history of welfare economics. Among her more 
recent contribution, there is a co-edited volume with Roger E. Backhouse and Tamotsu 
Nishisawa entitled Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values. Revisiting the History of 
Welfare Economics (2021). Gilardone, University of Caen, is an economist: she is interested in 
public policies, voting and democracy, social justice and human development, while her 
approach is oriented to the history of economic thought, philosophy of economics and feminist 
economics. Since 2020, she is an active member of the “History of Economics Diversity Caucus” 
                                                             
22 I have found these information on the website of the HDCA group. They have devoted a Prize in her honour, see: 
Kuklys prize | Human Development and Capability Association (hd-ca.org) 
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in order to promote inclusion, pluralism and opening to the history of economic and 
philosophical thought. Among her more recent works, there are two interesting historical 
analysis, namely Rawls’s influence and counter-influence on Sen: Post-welfarism and impartiality 
(2015) and a co-authored paper with Bréban,  A missing touch of Adam Smith in Amartya Sen’s 
account of public reasoning: the man within for the man without (2020). 
      In the abovementioned interview with Sen (Baujard, Gilardone and Salles, 2010), they shed 
a very different light on Sen’s capability approach in order to avoid certain dangerous 
absolutizations which can derive from excessive focus on this element only, as Erasmo (2019c) 
emphasized. In their successive works, these two female scholars are developing a new hermeneutics about Sen’s thought where capability approach acquires mainly a “heuristic 
value" (Baujard and Gilardone, 2017), while their main effort is a shift towards about further, 
underestimated elements concerning his thought, like positional objectivity, as they show in 
their very recent contribution (Baujard and Gilardone, 2020, p.3). In a nutshell, Baujard and 
Gilardone are supporting how positional objectivity refers to persons’ view where the guiding 
principles are those of agency and transpositional acceptability and impartiality. In turn, this 
allows to create a watershed between positional objectivity and impartiality which are 
fundamental for a more exhaustive reading of Sen’s theory of justice23. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
       The main result of this paper is that, on the one hand, Sen has favoured the enhancement of these female’s figures both in economics and philosophy; on the other, these female’s figures 
have undoubtedly and significantly influenced his own thought.  Thus, it is better to talk of a 
mutual and peer influence to each other. About the two contemporaries schools of thought 
analysed, I claim how one does not exclude the other because they are engaged in two different 
duties compared to economics: indeed, the exponents of the “capability approach-centered perspective” work on operative applications in concrete fields of economic reality, while the “capability approach-heuristic value perspective” is mainly a hermeneutic and historical approach to Sen’s thought in order to offer a more exhaustive reading of his thought. Finally, 
they have a different, but not conflictual perspective on the same author.  
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